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98 N.C. L. REV. 1029 (2020)

INTRODUCTION: LEGAL ETHICS IN THE AGE OF
TRUMP*
MICHAEL J. GERHARDT**
The North Carolina Law Review has had a long tradition of excellent
symposia on significant legal developments, but its timing this year may be the
Review’s best ever. Just a few weeks before the symposium convened in
October, the Speaker of the United States House of Representatives, Nancy
Pelosi, authorized the initiation of a formal impeachment inquiry against
President Donald Trump.1 Over the subsequent nine weeks, the House moved
expeditiously, and controversially, to impeach the President for abuse of power
for (1) soliciting the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelensky, to open a
criminal investigation into one of his political rivals, former Vice President
Joseph Biden, and for (2) obstruction of Congress for ordering others in his
administration not to comply and refusing to comply himself with lawful
congressional subpoenas to elicit information about the Ukraine affair.2 In the
span between January 16, 2020, and February 6, 2020, the Senate acquitted the
President after conducting the shortest impeachment trial yet for a President
and the only impeachment trial ever conducted in the Senate without
witnesses.3 Yet, throughout it all, the President did not act alone: the hearings
* © 2020 Michael J. Gerhardt.
** Burton Craige Distinguished Professor of Jurisprudence, University of North Carolina School
of Law. I wish to extend my thanks to editors Erin Bennett and Evelyn Yarborough for their excellent
work in coordinating and producing our symposium.
Editor’s Note: Professor Gerhardt testified in front of the House Judiciary Committee on July
12, 2019, on constitutional options for addressing presidential misconduct, and again on December 4,
2019, regarding the constitutional grounds for the impeachment of President Donald J. Trump. He
was one of three such scholars (along with Professor Noah Feldman from Harvard Law School and
Professor Pamela S. Karlan from Stanford Law School) invited by House Democrats to serve as
witnesses in the Trump proceeding. He also served as CNN’s impeachment expert throughout the
proceedings against President Trump, reprising a role that he performed for CNN during President
Clinton’s impeachment proceedings. In the latter, he testified as the only joint witness before the
House Judiciary Committee when it considered grounds for impeaching President Clinton.
1. Nicholas Fandos, Nancy Pelosi Announces Formal Impeachment Inquiry of Trump, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 24, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/24/us/politics/democrats-impeachmenttrump.html [http://perma.cc/M2KK-9ANZ (dark archive)].
2. See H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, THE IMPEACHMENT OF DONALD J. TRUMP
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. REP. NO. 116-346, at 4–5 (2019); see also Grace Panetta,
Everything You Need To Know About Trump’s Impeachment Process: What’s Happened, Who the Players Are,
and What Comes Next, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 27, 2020) https://www.businessinsider.com/trumpimpeachment-major-players-timeline-what-comes-next-2019-11 [https://perma.cc/3VZQ-5T3D].
3. See Peter Baker, Impeachment Trial Updates: Senate Acquits Trump, Ending Historic Trial, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 6, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/05/us/politics/impeachment-vote.html
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and news reports revealed involvement of several White House, National
Security, State Department, and Office of Management and Budget lawyers
whose actions were legally and ethically dubious, both in the Ukraine affair and
the ensuing impeachment process in Congress.4 Additionally, in the Senate
trial, the President’s lawyers not only skirted but often clearly breached ethical
rules. How the decisions and actions (or nonactions) of these lawyers are
worked out in the long run will be crucial for clarifying how far lawyers may go
to justify and facilitate a President’s refusals to comply with a legal process he
or she deems illegitimate, especially one that falls within the unique, or sole,
power of another branch.
Considering ethical and legal constraints on what government lawyers,
and lawyers who represent government officials, including the President, may
say or do when Congress exercises its impeachment authority is hardly new.
Watergate and its aftermath come quickly to mind as the most apt of
precedents.5 In the wake of President Richard Nixon’s resignation from office
in August 1974, a serious effort was undertaken to require the teaching of legal
ethics in law schools.6 This was done with the hope that such instruction would
inculcate in young lawyers the ethical rules and constraints with which they
must abide, even when they are working for the most powerful political leader
in the world—the President of the United States.7 The contributions to our
symposium provide valuable insights on how well that planned instruction has
worked, particularly since lawyers were closely involved in each step of how the
administration handled, or arranged, to delay national security funding for

[https://perma.cc/QV4F-KAKY (dark archive)]; Jennifer Haberkorn et al., Senate Votes Against Calling
Witnesses in Trump Impeachment Trial, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2020), https://www.latimes.com/politics/
story/2020-01-31/senate-impeach-trump-trial [https://perma.cc/RJ8H-L89W].
4. See, e.g., Letter from Pat Cipollone, White House Counsel, to House Leaders (Oct. 8, 2019),
https://games-cdn.washingtonpost.com/notes/prod/default/documents/7cb26618-e770-45ef-9c45bdd5554ce201/note/9608d380-f0df-4e07-8b08-8f326b723626.pdf#page=1
[https://perma.cc/6L2PHBCP]; Deb Reichmann, Impeachment Inquiry Focuses on 2 White House Lawyers, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(Nov. 1, 2019), https://apnews.com/01f2000ce18f44e89a8079ba6af2b546 [https://perma.cc/ENZ3RFG8]. See generally H.R. REP. NO. 116-346, at 2–3, 5 (2019) (chronicling the Ukraine call and the
involvement of the President’s private attorney, and the President’s urging of executive officials to
refuse to comply with congressional subpoenas).
5. Though the Model Rules of Professional Responsibility were already in effect at the time of
Watergate, the discussion of their relevance to the proceedings (and to the conduct of the President,
who was a lawyer) largely occurred after the proceedings, particularly with respect to the necessity for
teaching them in law school. See generally Michael Ariens, The Agony of Modern Legal Ethics, 1970–1985,
5 ST. MARY’S J. LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 134 (2015) (chronicling the renewed attention given
to legal ethics in the wake of the Watergate scandal and the impetus behind mandating the instruction
of ethics in ABA-approved law schools).
6. Mark Hansen, 1965–1974: Watergate and the Rise of Legal Ethics, A.B.A. J. (Jan. 1, 2015),
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/1965_1974_watergate_and_the_rise_of_legal_ethics
[https://perma.cc/426P-RXPX].
7. See id.
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Ukraine in an apparent exchange for its leader’s announcement of opening a
criminal investigation into former Vice President Biden and his son, Hunter.
The symposium’s subject—ethics in the age of Trump—was concededly
broad but not unbounded. Such a subject could go well beyond the President
and the lawyers in his administration to encompass lawyering more generally
over the past decade, which, admittedly, has raised a disturbing range of ethical
dilemmas, including a managing partner of one of the nation’s most elite law
firms paying intermediaries to defraud colleges to improve his daughter’s
chances for admission;8 lawyers who used the power of their offices to
intimidate witnesses and to expose the identity of a whistleblower in violation
of federal law;9 and a former Attorney General who had refused to comply with
a legislative subpoena to produce internal documents relating to the so-called
Fast and Furious Operation.10 This symposium focused specifically on private
and public lawyering associated with the President and his administration that
preceded and is likely ongoing since the activities that gave rise to the
President’s impeachment. The event brought together some of the nation’s
leading scholars to discuss the legal and ethical ramifications of prosecutorial
discretion in the Trump Administration; the efforts and duties of White House
and other administration lawyers doing the President’s bidding and perhaps
facilitating his misconduct, as set forth in the Articles of Impeachment; and the
private lawyers representing the President and other administration officials
with respect to the House Intelligence Committee and House Judiciary
Committee investigations that culminated in the President’s impeachment.
Several themes emerged from the contributions to the symposium. Here
are just three: issues surrounding situational ethics, concerns about possible
violations of ethical norms particularly in the context of interactions between
the Trump Administration and Ukraine, and opportunities for ethical reforms
to the practice of law in this country.
8. Nick Anderson, Ex-Leader at New York Law Firm Gets One Month in Prison in College Admissions
Scandal, WASH. POST (Oct. 3, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/education/2019/10/03/exleader-new-york-law-firm-gets-one-month-prison-college-admissions-scandal/
[http://perma.cc/
P9DH-BG2F (dark archive)].
9. Igor Derysh, Texas GOP Rep. Louie Gohmert Names Alleged Whistleblower at Televised
Impeachment Hearing, SALON (Dec. 12, 2019), https://www.salon.com/2019/12/12/texas-gop-rep-louiegohmert-names-alleged-whistleblower-at-televised-impeachment-hearing/ [https://perma.cc/2C6MC6XQ]; Rachel Frazin, Impeachment Witnesses Come Under Threats, Harassment, HILL (Nov. 23, 2019),
https://thehill.com/homenews/house/471703-impeachment-witnesses-come-under-threats-harassment
[http://perma.cc/27K7-443N]; Dan Sweeney, Florida Bar Will Investigate U.S. Rep. Matt Gaetz over
Potential Witness Intimidation, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale May 8, 2019), https://www.sunsentinel.com/news/politics/fl-ne-gaetz-cohen-bar-investigation-20190508vrdxkbxjyrcqzfypyxwnxxtmiq-story.html [https://perma.cc/U59B-T5YB].
10. Tim Ryan, Justice Dep’t Settles with House Panel on “Fast and Furious” Records, COURTHOUSE
NEWS SERV. (Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.courthousenews.com/justice-dept-settles-with-house-panelon-fast-furious-records/ [https://perma.cc/P9NU-UU9G].

98 N.C. L. REV. 1029 (2020)

1032

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 98

First, a dominant concern throughout the Articles is “situational ethics”—
the idea that the ethics of specific acts and decisions should be assessed within
their context.11 Numerous factors come into play when assessing the situational
ethics of any act or decision.12 Specifically in the context of the presidency,
where someone is within the hierarchy of the administration, to whom (and to
what extent) people inside and outside of the administration owe duties of
candor and truthfulness, and the acts and decisions themselves, are all essential
considerations for any analysis. For example, some of the people in the current
administration, including the President and the Secretary of State, are not
lawyers, and therefore their actions and duties are not governed by any code of
professional conduct but by the Constitution, our laws, and determinations (in
the context of impeachment proceedings) on whether they abused power,
breached the public trust, and/or seriously injured the Republic.13 Thus, the two
Articles of Impeachment approved against President Trump charged him with
no criminal misconduct or violations for which he could go to prison.14 Instead,
the House determined that the President’s abuse of powers and obstruction of
Congress violated the Constitution, the supreme law of the land.15 As such, the
actions were illegal and sufficiently serious misconduct to warrant his
impeachment.
Impeachment articles aside, President Trump, along with every other
official in his administration, is also subject to possible legal sanctions for
refusing to comply with congressional subpoenas.16 Congressional subpoenas
are lawful orders, the violations of which provide the bases for contempt of
Congress and possible fines and even jail time.17 It is useful to remember as well
that federal law requires executive branch employees to refrain from taking any
personal benefits in exchange for doing their jobs.18 Even if this law does not
11. See generally Randall Grometstein, Prosecutorial Misconduct and Noble-Cause Corruption, 43
CRIM. L. BULL. 63, 66–67 (2007) (discussing the elements of situational ethics).
12. See id.
13. See Articles of Impeachment Against Donald John Trump, H.R. Res. 755, 116th Cong. (2019).
14. Id.
15. Id.; see also Richie Duchon & Alex Johnson, House Judiciary Committee Publishes Full
Impeachment Report, NBC NEWS (Dec. 16, 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/trumpimpeachment-inquiry/house-judiciary-committee-publishes-full-impeachment-report-n1102531
[https://perma.cc/97TT-35P5].
16. See Jan Wolfe, Explainer: How Powerful Are Congress Subpoenas, Contempt Citations?, REUTERS
(May 2, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-congress-subpoena-explainer/explainerhow-powerful-are-congress-subpoenas-contempt-citations-idUSKCN1S81FP
[https://perma.cc/6TVU-G5H2]. But see Comm. on Judiciary v. McGahn, 951 F.3d 510, 516–22 (D.C.
Cir. 2020) (holding that the judiciary lacks the power to adjudicate operations disputes between the
other branches of government, and that as such, federal courts are unable to force a member of the
executive branch to comply with a legislative subpoena), reh’g en banc granted sub nom. U.S. House of
Representatives v. Mnuchin, No. 19-5176, 2020 WL 1228477 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
17. Wolfe, supra note 16.
18. See 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(2) (2018).
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apply directly to the President, it does apply to his cabinet secretaries and
everyone else within his administration,19 and any of them could be terminated
for such misconduct.20 For many members of Congress, the fact that the
President has done something for which everyone else in the administration
could be fired justifies his impeachment rather than any absolution.21 There is
no presidential immunity for a President’s abuse of power or any other
impeachable offense.22 In addition to issues of executive immunity, serving in
Congress does not protect a member, or a member’s staff, from punishment for
violating federal laws (for instance, failing to protect the identity of a
whistleblower) or intimidating witnesses who appear before them.23
All the aforementioned laws and ethical strictures apply to others in the
administration besides the President, such as the Attorney General, the White
House Counsel, the Counsel to the National Security Council, and the
President’s legal counsel, including the lawyers who defended him before the
House and the Senate. Two of the four Presidents who previously faced serious
impeachment—Richard Nixon and Bill Clinton—were lawyers and were
disbarred (at least temporarily) for some of their misconduct.24 Lawyers who
occupy these positions in the current administration and were, in the words of
the President’s Ambassador to the European Union, “in the loop” of the scheme
to pressure Ukraine’s leader to make an announcement beneficial to the
President’s reelection25 are subject to similar sanctions for facilitating any illegal
activity, which includes any abuse of power. As lawyers, their involvement with
these activities needs to be viewed in light of the ethical rules that bind the
profession. It is not clear whether some of these lawyers may seek refuge in
Rule 5.2 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which says that “[a]
19. See id. § 201(a).
20. Id. § 201(b).
21. See Articles of Impeachment Against Donald John Trump, H.R. Res. 755, 116th Cong. (2019).
22. See Susan Davis, Precedent Favors Democrats in Power Struggle with Trump, but It Could Take
Awhile, NPR (May 15, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/05/15/722872600/precedent-favorsdemocrats-in-power-struggle-with-trump-but-it-could-take-a-whil [https://perma.cc/F4LA-D3BA].
23. See generally TODD GARVEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45043, UNDERSTANDING THE
SPEECH OR DEBATE CLAUSE (Dec. 1, 2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45043.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3TVG-WJK6] (discussing the limitations and protections of the Speech or Debate
Clause of the Constitution).
24. See e.g., Tom Goldstein, New York Court Disbars Nixon for Watergate Acts, N.Y. TIMES (July 9,
1976), https://www.nytimes.com/1976/07/09/archives/new-york-court-disbars-nixon-for-watergateacts-nixon-disbarred-by.html [https://perma.cc/E37M-Y5W4 (dark archive)]; David A. Graham &
Cullen Murphy, The Clinton Impeachment, as Told by the People Who Lived It, ATLANTIC (Dec. 2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/12/clinton-impeachment/573940/
[https://perma.cc/YGX3-DGFK (dark archive)] (discussing the five-year suspension of President
Clinton’s law license).
25. Editorial Board, ‘Everyone Was in the Loop’: Gordon Sondland Makes Two Stunning Points,
WASH. POST (Nov. 20, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/everyonewas-in-the-loop-gordon-sondland-makes-two-stunning-points/2019/11/20/c57ea992-0bbf-11ea-8397a955cd542d00_story.html [https://perma.cc/F3QF-6KNM (dark archive)].
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subordinate lawyer does not violate the Rules of Professional Conduct if that
lawyer acts in accordance with a supervisory lawyer’s reasonable resolution of
an arguable question of professional duty.”26 Yet, that rule is not a safe harbor
for either the Attorney General or the Chief White House Counsel since
neither is “subordinate” to any attorney. Nor is that rule refuge for committing
illegal and inappropriate activity.27 One significant lesson of Watergate, as well
as the Nuremberg Trials, is that merely following orders is not a defense to the
participation in cover-ups or other crimes ordered by superiors.28 All such actors
are “in the loop” and covered by the ethical rules taught in law schools since
Watergate and adopted, in some form, in every state.29 These actors are also
subject to departmental or agency regulations governing their conduct, the
violations of which are also grounds for dismissal and other sanctions. Thus,
when assessing the ethics of administration lawyers or private counsel for the
President, such as Michael Cohen (who went to jail) and Rudy Giuliani (whom
the President acknowledged after the trial was, in fact, doing his bidding in
looking for dirt on the Bidens in Ukraine30), the particular circumstances of the
attorneys at the time of possible misconduct should be the focus of attention.
Serving in the government or representing the President is not a get-out-ofjail-free card or a pass on complying with the rules of professional
responsibility.
Second, I hasten to acknowledge that much is still not known about what
particular lawyers said and did (or did not do) with respect to the Ukraine affair
and refusals to comply with lawful subpoenas. When, for example, the Counsel
to the National Security Council, John Eisenberg, told Lieutenant Colonel
Alexander Vindman, who had concerns about the propriety of the July 25, 2019,
phone call between the President and Ukraine’s newly elected President, not to
talk to anyone else, and then proceeded to store the transcript on the nation’s
most secret server (which is meant for protecting sensitive codes),31 it is not
26. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.2(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N, 2019).
27. Douglas R. Richmond, Academic Silliness About Model Rule 5.2(b), 19 PROF. LAW. 15, 18 (2009)
(“In short, subordinate lawyers always have a duty to question supervisory lawyers’ ethical judgments
and oppose illegal commands even in the presence of Rule 5.2(b).”).
28. See Hansen, supra note 6; Anthony Lewis, The Argument of “Acting Under Orders” Doesn’t Work,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 1975), https://www.nytimes.com/1975/01/05/archives/the-argument-of-actingunder-orders-doesnt-work-lessons-of.html [https://perma.cc/E5ZY-PL7L (dark archive)].
29. Hansen, supra note 6.
30. See Marshall Cohen, Trump Contradicts Past Denials, Admits Sending Giuliani to Ukraine, CNN
(Feb. 14, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/02/13/politics/trump-rudy-giuliani-ukraine-interview/
index.html [https://perma.cc/AER3-BVSB]; see also Jordan Fabian & Bill Allison, Giuliani’s Tangled
Role with Trump Skirts Conflicts, Tests Laws,
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 17, 2020),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-01-17/giuliani-s-tangled-role-with-trump-skirtsconflicts-tests-laws [https://perma.cc/68PW-YGYT (dark archive)].
31. Jeremy Herb, Impeachment Testimony: Vindman Was Told Not To Discuss Trump-Zelensky Call,
CNN (Nov. 2, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/11/01/politics/alexander-vindman-john-eisenbergtestimony/index.html [http://perma.cc/P2YU-ZL8W].
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clear, at least yet, whether he was taking any of these actions as parts of a coverup or an effort to do an investigation of the President’s possible misconduct. So
many lawyers involved in the circumstances leading to the President’s
impeachment refused to testify before Congress or participate in any inquiry
into those circumstances. Their refusal raises significant questions about the
lawyers’ compliance with Rule 3.3.32 The Rule requires all lawyers, even those
in the highest reaches of the executive branch, to be candid and truthful in their
statements and actions in legal proceedings, including legislative ones.33
The concerns about Trump’s lawyers violating Rule 3.3 became more
acute—and more apparent—in his Senate trial. I have made this argument
before, both in commentary on air with CNN and in print.34 Nor am I alone in
thinking the lawyers violated Rule 3.3. The rule requires that lawyers not “make
a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement
of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer.”35 The
comments to the Rule make clear that legislative bodies such as the Senate count
as tribunals for purposes of the rule. Rule 8.4 forbids lawyers from “engag[ing]
in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation” and from
“conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.”36 Rule 3.7 forbids

32. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3 cmt. 3 (AM. BAR ASS’N, 2019) (“There are
circumstances where failure to make a disclosure is the equivalent of an affirmative
misrepresentation.”); see also id. r. 3.3 cmt. 12 (“[3.3(b)] requires a lawyer to take reasonable remedial
measures, including disclosure if necessary, whenever the lawyer knows that a person . . . has engaged
in criminal or fraudulent conduct related to the proceeding.”).
33. See id. r. 3.3.
34. See Michael J. Gerhardt, Four Fundamental Flaws in President Trump’s Impeachment Trial Memo,
JUST SECURITY (Jan. 21, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/68181/four-fundamental-flaws-inPresident-trumps-impeachment-trial-memo/ [https://perma.cc/9M7E-HUZS]; Michael J. Gerhardt,
Trump’s Impeachment Defense Boils Down to This: Treat Me Like a King, WASH. POST (Oct. 12, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/10/12/trumps-impeachment-defense-boils-down-thistreat-me-like-an-english-king/ [http://perma.cc/L52R-XXT4 (dark archive)] [hereinafter Gerhardt,
Boils Down]. I cite these in response to Professor Jonathan Turley’s taking me to task for questioning
the White House lawyers’ ethics without substantiating my claim. Indeed, he claims the aspersion,
without foundation, is an ethical problem. It was not hard to find the claims I made, including in
Professor Turley’s hometown newspaper, and it is sadly ironic that he stoops to an attack on me
personally, the go-to method made by the President and his defenders when they cannot and do not
argue substance. Professor Turley’s equating zealous lawyering with breaking the rules is problematic
too. A good lawyer never practices close to the ethical boundaries, while ethically challenged lawyers
are eager to take refuge in their overstated protections accorded for zealous advocacy. The rules
themselves do not call for zealous advocacy but instead place a number of ethical constraints on lawyers
not just bending but breaking the law or the rules to please their clients. Nor am I alone in raising
concerns about the White House lawyers’ over-zealous advocacy. See, e.g., Stephen Gillers, Impeachment
Trial and Legal Ethics: Cipollone Should Be a Witness, Not a Trump Lawyer, JUST SECURITY (Jan. 27,
2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/68264/impeachment-trial-and-legal-ethics-pat-cipollone-shouldbe-a-witness-not-a-trump-lawyer/ [https://perma.cc/RH23-J5G6]. The House Managers made this
same argument in a January 21 letter to Mr. Cipollone. See id.
35. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3(a).
36. See id. r. 8.4 (c)–(d).
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lawyers from being advocates and witnesses on the same matter, which raises a
problem for Chief White House Counsel Pat Cipollone, whom John Bolton
says was present when the President pushed him to pressure Ukraine.37
I need not mention all the statements of White House lawyers that skirt
or run afoul of Rules 3.3 and 8.4, but here are some examples of troublesome
conduct:
(1) Mr. Cipollone telling the Senate that the House Managers “hid
evidence” from the Senate (there is nothing to support that assertion);38
(2) Mr. Cipollone claiming that the House Managers did not “believe in
the facts of their case” (completely contrary to the facts);39
(3) Mr. Cipollone complaining that “[n]ot even Mr. Schiff’s Republican
colleagues were allowed into” the special room where witnesses were testifying
before the Committee on the Ukraine affair (completely false, the Republican
committee members were all allowed to be present);40
(4) President Trump’s personal attorney, Jay Sekulow, telling the Senate
that the President was “denied the right to access evidence” and “the right to
have counsel present at hearings” (the President and his counsel were invited
to participate in the House Judiciary Committee hearings but declined);41
(5) Mr. Sekulow saying the Mueller Report showed “no obstruction” (in
fact it listed multiple instances of it);42
(6) Mr. Cipollone commenting that the Ukraine aide was given “on time”
(in fact the delay caused by the President prevented all the aid from being given
to Ukraine in time to meet the deadline set for the appropriation);43
37. Id. r. 3.7 (limiting the ability of an attorney to “act as an advocate at a trial in which [he] is
likely to be a necessary witness” except in those circumstances when “(1) the testimony relates to an
uncontested issue; (2) the testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services rendered in the
case; or (3) disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship on the client”); see also
Gillers, supra note 34.
38. Calvin Woodward, AP Fact Check: Trump’s Impeachment Defense and the Facts, ASSOCIATED
PRESS (Jan. 25, 2020), https://apnews.com/2ce0cdd506b5347b69607a1cabe7d1ab [https://perma.cc/
XY3Z-DTRJ].
39. Id.
40. Max Boot, Trump’s Lawyers Are Playing a Bad Hand Badly, WASH. POST (Jan. 22, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/01/22/democrats-are-winning-argument-eventhough-theyll-lost-senate-trial/ [https://perma.cc/49FW-83Z9 (dark archive)]; Aaron Rupar, Trump’s
Lawyers Began the Impeachment Trial with a Blizzard of Lies, VOX (Jan. 21, 2020),
https://www.vox.com/2020/1/21/21075791/trump-impeachment-lawyers-jay-sekulow-pat-cipolloneopening-statement [https://perma.cc/ KVL9-8NUM].
41. See Rupar, supra note 40.
42. Daniel Dale, Fact Check: Trump Lawyers Make At Least Three False Claims During Impeachment
Arguments, CNN (Jan. 22, 2020), https://cnn.com/2020/01/22/politics/trump-lawyers-impeachmentfalse-claims-scif/index.html [https://perma.cc/NW4H-JEFA]; see also Boot, supra note 40 (discussing
Mr. Sekulow’s commentary on the Mueller Report).
43. Bart Jansen et al., Senate Adopts Rules for Trump Impeachment Trial Following Marathon Session,
11 Defeated Amendments, USA TODAY (Jan. 22, 2020) https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/
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(7) Deputy White House Counsel Michael Purpura declaring “[t]here was
no quid pro quo on the call” in spite of the President’s own chief of staff
admitting there was;44
(8) Professor Alan Dershowitz claiming that a President who thought his
reelection was in the nation’s best interest could solicit foreign interference on
his behalf (even though neither the law nor the Constitution allow a President
to do this);45
(9) Mr. Cipollone charging that Adam Schiff “manufactured a fraudulent
version of [the] phone call”46 and that his paraphrase of the call was “a complete
fake” (in fact, the call transcript was already public at the time and Schiff’s
characterizations were consistent with it); and
(10) Deputy White House Counsel Patrick Philbin asserting that Rudy
Giuliani was not engaged in “foreign policy” on behalf of the United States
(though Giuliani and others say he did just that, and the President admitted
that after the trial) and that it was not illegal for the President to solicit foreign
assistance for his reelection (neither the Constitution nor any law of this land
allows a President to do this).47
In denying the assertion made in John Bolton’s forthcoming book that he
was present at a meeting when the President urged Bolton to pressure Ukraine’s
President to make the announcement of the opening of a criminal investigation
of the Bidens, Mr. Cipollone made himself a witness in the same matter in
which he was performing as an advocate. (And the President waived any claim
of executive privilege to keep private conversations he had with Bolton when
he publicly declared Bolton’s account false.48)
Apart from the impeachment hearings, Attorney General William Barr,
too, has been the subject of ethical concerns. Since the beginning of the year
there have been multiple complaints made by the New York Bar Association
politics/2020/01/21/senate-impeachment-trial-trump-rules-witnesses/4493149002/ [https://perma.cc/
5T4R-ZZ4D].
44. The New York Times, Trump Impeachment: Highlights of Saturday’s Trial, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/25/us/politics/trump-impeachment-hearings-saturday.html
[https://perma.cc/F44D-PNU8 (dark archive)].
45. Eliza Relman & Sonam Sheth, Trump Lawyer Alan Dershowitz Argues Trump Can Do Whatever
He Wants To Get Reelected If He Believes Another Term Is in the Public Interest, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 29,
2020),
https://www.businessinsider.com/alan-dershowitz-trump-re-election-public-interest-2020-1
[https://perma.cc/B3XZ-3SFA].
46. See Rupar, supra note 40.
47. Dareh Gregorian, White House’s Philbin Suggests President Will Keep Using Giuliani as
International ‘Confidante,’ NBC NEWS (Jan. 30, 2020), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/trumpimpeachment-inquiry/live-blog/trump-impeachment-trial-live-coverage-senators-ask-questionswitness-battle-n1126271/ncrd1126941#liveBlogHeader [https://perma.cc/DSL9-65BR].
48. See Barbara McQuade, Trump Waived Executive Privilege When He Called Bolton a Liar, WASH.
POST (Jan. 27, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/01/27/trump-waived-executiveprivilege-when-he-called-bolton-liar/ [https://perma.cc/X64B-CC7K (dark archive)].
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concerning Barr and speeches he made in the fall of 2019.49 On January 8, 2020,
the Association sent a letter to both chambers of Congress requesting an
investigation into the activities of Attorney General Barr citing concerns that
they “threaten[] public confidence in the fair and impartial administration of
justice.”50 Later, on February 12, the New York City Bar Association wrote a
letter to the Department of Justice Inspector General and the leaders of both
the House and Senate Judiciary Committees requesting formal investigations
into Barr’s and the Department’s “making prosecutorial decisions based not on
neutral principles but in order to protect President Trump’s supporters and
friends.”51 Presumably, the Inspector General and House and Senate Judiciary
Committees might identify whether Barr and/or any other high-ranking
departmental officials have committed any violations of any laws, regulations,
or ethical rules warranting impeachment or other possible sanctions for their
misconduct. At the time of the publication of our Symposium, neither the
Inspector General nor either Judicial Committee had yet taken any steps to
investigate the circumstances relating to apparent preferential treatment given
to the President’s friends and supporters.
Last but not least, the Symposium considered what reforms may be needed
to prevent any further circumvention of ethical norms and rules. It is naïve to
think that merely requiring the instruction of legal ethics in law schools will
ensure lawyers comport themselves in perfect accordance with the rules of
professional responsibility. Such instruction might have diminished the
numbers of lawyers who engage in unethical conduct, but there is no proof of
such a consequence and, as we all know, much unethical lawyering goes
undetected because of efforts to keep it below radar. For example, in refusing
to comply with legislative subpoenas to elicit information about possible abuse
of power, White House lawyers make it more difficult, if not impossible for the
public to hold them accountable for their ethical breaches. If such noncompliance goes unchecked, these lawyers leave office with the confidence of
knowing they leave behind—hidden from any authorities that could hold them
accountable—their subversions of law, support for or participation in abuses of
power, and failures to abide by the Rules of Professional Conduct.

49. Greg Farrell, NYC Bar Association Asks Congress To Investigate AG Barr for Bias, BLOOMBERG
(Jan. 9, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-01-09/investigate-barr-for-bias-n-ybar-association-tells-congress, [https://perma.cc/64M4-SWGS (dark archive)].
50. Amanda Robert, NYC Bar Calls for Investigation into AG Barr over Conduct that Threatens
‘Impartial Administration of Justice,’ A.B.A. J. (Jan. 10, 2020), https://www.abajournal.com/
news/article/new-york-city-bar-association-calls-for-investigation-into-ag-barr
[https://perma.cc/
G997-994G].
51. Jennifer Rubin, The New York City Bar Goes After William Barr, WASH. POST (Feb. 13, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/02/13/bar-goes-after-barr/ [https://perma.cc/9R8VGNJZ (dark archive)].
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Perhaps most confounding is the question of whether lawyers’ justification
for the forced silence of so many witnesses passes constitutional muster because
it has been done arguably in service of a (dubious) theory of absolute executive
entitlement to maintain control over information produced within and by the
executive branch. The claim of any such entitlement is grounded in the unitary
theory of the executive, which posits that all executive power must be under the
control of the President.52 The problem is that the theory has no grounding in
constitutional law, except for Justice Scalia’s sole dissent in Morrison v. Olson.53
Judicial precedents, as well as legislative practice, cut in the other direction.54
When the Chief White House Counsel grounds his refusal to comply with a
legislative inquiry and legislative subpoenas on the basis of such a theory, he
seeks refuge in the dangerous and legally unsound principle that he, like the
President, is above the law.55 The Symposium may not have fully addressed the
question of whether the silence of lawyers and their refusals to comply with
legislative inquiries and subpoenas is illegal and unethical, but it hopefully will
enrich lawyers’ understandings of how to analyze their ethical obligations when
asked to support or defend unconstitutional abuses of power or illegal conduct.
52. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 726 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that there is a
“constitutional principle that the President ha[s] to be the repository of all executive power”).
53. Id.
54. See, e.g., Susan Hennessey & Benjamin Wittes, The Disintegration of the American Presidency,
ATLANTIC (Jan. 21, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/01/trump-myth-unitaryexecutive/605062/ [https://perma.cc/2K8M-UHF4 (dark archive)] (chronicling the declining
applicability of the unitary theory of the executive hastened by the development of the executive
bureaucracy and the fracturing of the executive branch under the Trump Administration); History
News Network, A Brief History of the ‘Unitary Theory’ that Trump and Barr Are Using To Resist
Congressional Oversight, RAWSTORY (June 4, 2019), https://www.rawstory.com/2019/06/a-briefhistory-of-the-unitary-theory-that-trump-and-barr-are-using-to-resist-congressional-oversight/
[https://perma.cc/885L-V3LT] (discussing the fact that the unitary theory of the executive is not
mentioned in the Constitution, that U.S. political history suggests that “[t]he concept of Congressional
oversight over the executive branch is a long-established precedent,” and that the Supreme Court has
“ruled twice on the unitary executive theory, and both times rejected the concept”); Jed Shugerman,
Stare Scalia, SLATE (Apr. 27, 2018), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/04/republican-senatorsobsession-with-antonin-scalia-is-leading-them-to-make-sloppy-mistakes.html
[https://perma.cc/
5SHM-5ZCE] (discussing the difficulty of reconciling Justice Scalia’s view of the unitary theory of the
executive (as portrayed by his dissent in Morrison) with U.S. history and judicial precedent); see also
Michael J. Gerhardt, Constitutional Arrogance, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1649, 1661–66 (2016) (describing the
now-defunct Tenure in Office Act and Supreme Court cases concerning the removal powers of the
President as historical limitations on the President’s control over the executive branch); Mark Tushnet,
Legislative and Executive Stare Decisis, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1339, 1350–54 (2018) (discussing the
concept of executive stare decisis as a means of preserving credibility and showing the fact that agency
policies “transcend specific administrations” as well as the “fact that the [current President may have]
particular views about the presidency’s legal and constitutional status and power is no more than a
tactical consideration”). See generally Michael J. Gerhardt, Constitutional Construction and
Departmentalism: A Case Study of the Demise of the Whig Presidency, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 425 (2010)
(describing the evolution of the power of the executive over time with a focus on circumstances when
other theories of the executive were favored over the unitary theory of the executive).
55. See Gerhardt, Boils Down, supra note 34.
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Each of the four symposium Articles56 offers significant insights into this
compelling question. First, in Congressional Subpoenas in Court, Amandeep
Grewal, professor of law at the University of Iowa Law School, looks at the
question of whether Congress has standing to enlist judicial enforcement of the
subpoenas that President Trump and other administration officials refused to
comply with. To answer the question, he adopts a “public trust approach” for
understanding that Congress and its individual members “exercise authority
only in representational capacities.”57 Therefore, he suggests, the only harm
Congress or its members may incur as a result of refusals to comply with the
House’s subpoenas is not personal. Without any personal injury, Congress lacks
standing to ask for judicial enforcement of its subpoenas. He goes further to
examine the complications that are likely to arise if the Court is asked to enforce
such subpoenas. This is precisely the question the Supreme Court has agreed
to hear in cases set for argument this year.58
Next, Rebecca Roiphe, a professor of law at New York Law School and
former prosecutor, examines in A Typology of Justice Department Lawyers’ Roles
and Responsibilities the ethical norms and institutional practices of Justice
Department lawyers that the President has attacked. She suggests that the
answer to how Justice Department lawyers should comport themselves
“depends on the position that the lawyer holds and the work that the lawyer is
doing.”59 There is no one-size-fits-all for Justice Department lawyers but
instead “the Department of Justice ought to strike a proper balance between
responsiveness and independence, ensuring effectiveness and accountability
while maintaining enough independence from the President to guarantee the
orderly development of the law and its fair application.”60 This means, as she
explains, that department lawyers have “different roles” and are bound by “the
ethical obligations that ought to accompany those roles.”61 In determining these
obligations, she states, “[t]he goal is to maintain the neutrality of law and its
even-handed application to objectively determined facts, so that the
56. One participant in the Symposium, Richard Painter, professor of law at the University of
Minnesota Law School, has published his contributions to the Symposium in his recent book,
RICHARD W. PAINTER & PETER GOLENBOCK, AMERICAN NERO: THE HISTORY OF THE
DESTRUCTION OF THE RULE OF LAW, AND WHY TRUMP IS THE WORST OFFENDER (2020).
57. Amandeep Grewal, Congressional Subpoenas in Court, 98 N.C. L. REV. 1043 (2020).
58. Order Granting Writ of Certiorari, Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 659 (2019); Order Granting
Writ of Certiorari, Trump v. Mazars USA, 140 S. Ct. 660 (2019); Order Granting Writ of Certiorari,
Trump v. Deutsche Bank, 140 S. Ct. 660 (2019); see also Josh Gerstein, Supreme Court To Hear 3 Cases
Seeking Access to Trump’s Financial and Tax Records, POLITICO (Dec. 13, 2019),
https://www.politico.com/news/2019/12/13/supreme-court-to-hear-three-cases-seeking-access-totrumps-financial-and-tax-records-084824 [http://perma.cc/9Q67-XLDP].
59. Rebecca Roiphe, A Typology of Justice Department Lawyers’ Roles and Responsibilities, 98 N.C. L.
REV. 1077, 1079 (2020).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1080.
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Department of Justice can remain a constraint on power while not unnecessarily
hobbling the elected officials in their ability to implement policy.”62 As she
illustrates through a series of examples, this “goal” informs department lawyers’
decisionmaking and ethical obligations in practice.
In Defending the Constitutionality of Federal Statutes, Andrew Hessick, a
professor of law at the University of North Carolina School of Law, examines
the role of Justice Department lawyers defending federal statutes, a role that he
suggests lacks ethical foundation. This role is further complicated when it is
unclear whether “defending” the constitutionality of a federal statute “is in the
interest of the United States.”63 In practice, an omnipresent concern is that
there is pressure on Justice Department lawyers to do the bidding of their
superiors and, therefore, they may have far less interest in protecting
congressional prerogatives, or none, than they do in protecting the President
from Congress. He uses the example of the Affordable Care Act to illustrate
the phenomenon of how, in pushing the executive branch’s self-interest in
litigation, the Department of Justice has undermined Congress’s role as
policymaker.
Finally, in Training Law Students To Maintain Civility in Their Law Practices
as a Way To Improve Public Discourse, Nancy Rapoport, professor of law at the
University of Nevada-Las Vegas, turns her attention to the challenges of
training law students at a time of severe political divisiveness, the very
challenges that the push to teach professional responsibility in every law school
was designed to address. Students are prone to reflect the same disdain for an
opponent’s arguments as our leaders do. To combat this, she suggests a renewed
commitment to teaching students how to have a civil discussion when arguing
about the law or asserting their positions in court or other venues.64 This is
easier to describe than to do, but she shows us how focusing on the issues,
respecting other people’s views, and acting with genuine humility may restore
lawyers’ valuable contributions to society, including becoming models for the
nation as a whole. Professor Rapoport’s invaluable reminder of lawyers’
constructive role in society—not just in courts, the executive branch, and
legislatures—captures well the purpose of our collective undertaking in this
issue. And it raises a direct challenge to government or White House lawyers
who see their duty as covering up a President’s misdeeds. These lawyers learned
nothing from the Watergate saga.

62. Id.
63. F. Andrew Hessick, Defending the Constitutionality of Federal Statutes, 98 N.C. L. REV. 1185
(2020).
64. See Nancy B. Rapoport, Training Law Students To Maintain Civility in Their Law Practices as a
Way To Improve Public Discourse, 98 N.C. L. REV. 1143, 1146 (2020).
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